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How Important is a Title? An Examination of
the Private Law Created by The Motion
Picture Association of America
I. INTRODUCTION
How important is a movie title? "There's no way to exaggerate
how important a movie title can be."1 Joe Roth, studio chief of Walt
Disney Company, explains, "We're surrounded by so much cultural
clutter that you're halfway home if you can find a title that helps you
distinguish your product or connect it with a special image."2 For a
marketing-conscious movie executive like Roth, movie titles are worth
big money. When Disney first developed Ransom, the Mel Gibson
thriller about a father rescuing his son from diabolical kidnappers, Sony
Pictures already owned the title.' Roth wanted the title so bad that he
paid $600,000 to obtain it.4 "I would do it again in a second," Roth
says.' "It was absolutely perfect. Imagine having a one word title for a
Mel Gibson movie that tells you the whole story of the film."
6
Deals like this are commonplace among the "big boys" of the
movie industry, but why?7 Why was Disney required to pay for the use
of the title Ransom? How did Sony own the rights to the title of an
unreleased movie, and who was protecting those rights? Furthermore,
how did Disney learn that Sony owned the rights to the title? The
answers to these questions lead to a single source: The Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA).
The MPAA, along with its international counterpart, the Motion
Picture Association (MPA), serve as the voice and advocate of the
American motion picture, home video, and television industries.8 The
MPAA has over 150,000 titles on file at its Title Registration Bureau
1. Patrick Goldstein, Hey, Let's Play the Movie Title Game! The Crucial Search for a
Perfect Grabber Can Be a Long, Complicated and Expensive Process, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997,





6. Id. (noting that Disney's Ransom grossed over $136 million domestically).
7. See id. (noting at least seven similar title fights in 1997 alone); see also Linda Lee, A
Banner Year for Movie Title Tangles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at DI.
8. See About the MPA, MPAA, at http://www.mpaa.org/about/content.htm (last visited Dec.
5, 2001).
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(the "Bureau").9 Registering a movie title with the Bureau is analogous
to copywriting an invention,' ° and is currently the best way to protect a
title from unauthorized use.'1 Through its arbitration process, the
Bureau privately settles all disputes regarding conflicting movie titles. 2
Additionally, the Bureau has its own operating rules and substantive
guidelines by which its arbitration panels abide when resolving title con-
flicts.' 3 Similar to other arbitrators, the Bureau's arbitrators generally
do not apply judicial law. 4 When parties contract into arbitration
clauses, they contract out of all the law that a court would have applied
but for the arbitration agreement. 15 In effect, the arbitrators are privatiz-
ing the respective segments of judicial law. Thus, the MPAA has effec-
tively privatized public law.' 6
This Comment discusses the ramifications of the MPAA's priva-
tization of law. Part II examines the importance of a movie's title. Part
III outlines the direct negotiation and arbitration procedures exercised by
the subscribers to the Bureau and regulated by the MPAA's Title Com-
mittee (the "Committee"). Part IV compares two different sources of
law: (1) the Bureau's "private law," and (2) federal and state public
trademark laws. Lastly, Part V assesses the consequences of the
MPAA's arbitration process and its privatization of law.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TITLE
Motion picture production companies will do almost anything to
find the perfect movie title: educated market research,' 7 extensive con-
sumer testing,18 countless mall interceptions,' 9 hundreds of prerelease
9. Linda Lee, supra note 7.
10. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, Director, Title Registration Bureau (Oct.
22, 2001).
11. See Memorandum of the Title Committee of the Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc. at 1-2 (Apr. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Title Committee Memorandum] ("The Bureau shall be the
central registration bureau for titles of theatrical motion pictures submitted for listing by service
Subscribers.") (on file with the author).
12. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8 (defining the Bureau's arbitration
process).
13. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
14. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 707-26 (1999).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Goldstein, supra note I.
18. See id.
19. See id. (defining "mall intercept" as a technique whereby researchers stand outside
heavily trafficked movie theaters and show moviegoers various mock-ups of a film poster, all with
the same imagery and lettering, but with different titles).
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viewings,2 ° and spending millions of dollars.2' Why do these companies
go through such a long, complicated, and expensive process of choosing
something as trivial as a title? Given the rising cost of making and mar-
keting a movie, which (according to the MPAA) averages from $54.9
million for production and $27.3 million for prints and advertising,22 a
recognizable title can give studios the upper hand, especially during the
film's crucial opening weekend.23 Studio marketing experts believe that
a bad title can irreparably harm a film's first image with moviegoers.24
"A movie starts to breathe with a title, it's the first thing about a film
that audiences are exposed to," says Tom Sherak, chairman of Twentieth
Century Fox's domestic film group. 5 According to Sherak, "when
you're up against dozens of other films, it's important to make a good
first impression.1"26 For instance, Sherak regrets not coining a different
name for the 1991 drama Dying Young.2 7 The unsuccessful film stars
Julia Roberts in a story about a dying man who falls in love with his
nurse. Sherak recalls, "It was a tough sell under any circumstances, but
that title made it seem even more downbeat than it was. It was so bad
that when we made up promotional T-shirts for the film, nobody wanted
to wear them."
28
Some studios have been fortunate to catch a bad title before the
film's release. The 1998 Twentieth Century Fox film The Edge, starring
Anthony Hopkins, was originally titled The Bookworm.29 The studio
used research audiences to test the film, and the recruited moviegoers
gasped and thrilled in all the right places.30 They loved the movie,
recalls producer Art Linson, but they hated the title.3 Fortunately, the
studio had enough time to change the title to The Edge before the film
hit the market.
3 2
For every film, studios must go through a similar process of select-
20. See id.
21. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., 155 F. Supp. 2d I, 7 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (discussing Fox's payment of $1.6 million for the rights to the title and characters of their
2000 movie, X-Men.).
22. See Dave Larsen, Can Hollywood Have an Original Concept?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Feb. 20, 2002, at F5, available at 2002 WL 4586677.
23. See id.
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ing a workable title.3 3 The most difficult aspect of choosing a title is
that competing studios often have already registered the best titles with
the Bureau.34 When a conflict arises, the studio must either create a new
title or confront the competing studio.35 This process is Hollywood's
version of the name game, and the judge, jury, and lawmaker of this
game is the Motion Picture Association of America and its Title Arbitra-
tion Bureau.
III. THE BUREAU'S PROCESS
Titles, whether for books or movies, cannot be registered as trade-
marks.3 6 Similar to the protection trademark law would provide, how-
ever, the Bureau has been charged with avoiding "identical usage or
harmful similarity" in American movie titles since 1925. 37 The Bureau
provides a service to which all members of the MPAA must subscribe.38
These Bureau members (the "Subscribers") must register new titles
before they use them. 39 When a studio buys scripts or books, or when
an exciting event occurs, 41 or whenever a studio believes they might
conceivably make a movie about a topic, it registers the proposed title
with the Bureau.4  Each member may register up to 250 permanent
titles for protection at any given time.42 The larger studios, however,
using corporate-umbrella entities, retain thousands of titles.43 Addition-
33. See id. (providing a listing of replaced motion picture titles: Disney's Space Cadet was
changed to Rocket Man; Disney's In Pursuit of Honor was changed to G.I. Jane; MGM's Birds of
a Feather was changed to The Birdcage; Disney's My Posse Don't Do Their Homework was
changed to Dangerous Minds; Disney's Coma Guy was changed to While You Were Sleeping; and
TriStar's Cop Gives Waitress a $1 Million Tip was changed to It Could Happen to You).
34. See Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
35. See id.
36. See infra Part IV; see also Mark S. Lee, Trademark Essentials, SD58 ALI-ABA 1, at 19
(1999).
37. See Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
38. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that all members of the
MPAA shall be required to subscribe to the service of the Bureau; producers and distributors who
are not members of the MPAA shall be afforded the opportunity to subscribe on a voluntary
basis).
39. See id. at 2 (stating that Subscribers shall register the title of each and every one of their
United States theatrical motion pictures with the Bureau).
40. See Carla Hall, Christopher Columbus-The Lawsuit; Moviemakers Go to Court For the
Discoverer's Name, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1990, at C01, available at 1990 WL 2095929 (quoting
Dorothy Beer, former head of the Bureau) (finding that movie companies often try to comer the
title market). For example, when the Israeli raid on the Entebbe, Uganda airport made headlines
in the 1970s, one company registered a dozen Entebbe titles. Id. When Marilyn Monroe died,
another company registered at least ten movie variations using her name. Id.
41. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11.
42. Id. at 4 (noting that the Permanent Original List shall be limited to 250 entries per
Subscriber-protection shall be permanent for all titles on this list unless the title is withdrawn).
43. See Goldstein, supra note I.
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ally, the Bureau allows Subscribers to register an unlimited amount of
titles on a non-permanent basis." As time passes, and studios continue
to register titles at a rapid rate, a record number of conflicts develop
each year.4 5
How do Subscribers discover a conflict? The Bureau issues a daily
title-registration report that tracks newly registered titles.46 If a Sub-
scriber feels a proposed title is harmfully similar to its already registered
title, it must file a complaint within ten business days.47 That Subscriber
cannot use the protested title until usage rights are conclusively deter-
mined.48 To determine these rights, the conflicting parties are presented
two choices: (1) settling by direct negotiation; or (2) sending the com-
plaint to the president of the MPAA for resolution.49
Upon receiving a complaint, the president of the MPAA sends it to
an arbitration panel composed of at least three disinterested Title Com-
mittee members.50 In effect, these arbitrators are judges; in actuality,
they are movie studio executives. 5' Still, courts will enforce the arbitra-
tors' decision under the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 which requires courts
to enforce arbitration decisions "save upon grounds as exist in law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. ' 53 Thus, the MPAA's private
arbitration process allows movie studio executives, acting as arbitrators,
to create binding law.
Although the creation of law is a core function of government,54
"private-law" created through arbitration has become a considerable
source of recent law. A main concern with this influx of "private law"
is that while government adjudication requires that the decision-maker
be the judge and/or jury, private arbitration merely requires a panel of
44. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3-5 (outlining the Bureau's
procedures for movie title registration).
45. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
46. Id.
47. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7. ("[No protest shall be valid
unless a copy of [the] same and fees payable are received by the Title Registration Bureau within
the ten day time period specified above.").
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 8. If the parties fail to reach a settlement through direct negotiation, the dispute
shall be referred to the president of the MPAA by a formal written request for arbitration. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. (stating the Title Committee shall be made up of a representative and an alternate
from each of the member studios of the MPAA).
52. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
53. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Ware, supra note 14, at 737 (analyzing the extent to
which the FAA requires and permits courts to review arbitrator's decisions).
54. See generally U.S. CoNsr. art. I § 8; see also U.S. CoNST. art. III.
55. See Ware, supra note 14, at 705-08 (defining "private-law" as privately created law that is
enforced by government and outlining how arbitration creates "private-law").
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arbitrators. 6 Nonetheless, both forms of adjudication result in court
enforceable decisions. 7 Thus, "private law" grants arbitrators great
power, and the arbitrators of the MPAA's Title Registration Bureau pro-
vide no exception. 8
A. Negotiations
It is rare that the Bureau's arbitrators get to use this broad lawmak-
ing power, as most movie title conflicts never reach arbitration. 9 Of the
thousands of complaints member studios registered with the Bureau last
year, only four cases were settled through arbitration.6" Why does this
happen? Instead of arbitrating, the top executives of the production
companies 61 settle everything behind closed doors.62  Although the
Bureau publishes no operating rules or standards for conducting negotia-
tions, and despite the cloud of confidentiality that cloaks the process,6 3
history has exposed certain particulars.
For example, if a studio wants to use a title registered by a rival
studio, it can offer to buy it (like when Disney bought Ransom), or it can
offer one of its own registered film titles in exchange for the desired
title. 64  For instance, one of Disney's blockbuster 1998 films was a
Pixar-produced computer-animation comedy called A Bug's Life.65
Because the movie was aimed at family audiences, Warner Brothers pro-
duction studios lodged a protest to protect its most valuable animated
character, Bugs Bunny.66 The conflict resulted in a trade: Disney sur-
rendered the rights to two of its titles, Father's Day and Conspiracy
Theory, in exchange for permission to use "Bug's" in its title.67
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 (stating any party can enforce an
award of an arbitration or appeals panel in any court of competent jurisdiction).
59. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
60. See id.
61. See About the MPA, MPAA, supra note 8. In addition to being on the board of directors
for the MPAA, executives from the following companies are also the chairmen and presidents of
the seven major producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs in the
United States: Disney Company, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc.,
Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal Studios Inc., and Warner
Brothers. Id.
62. See Linda Lee, Name Those Movies: Would a Feature Film By Another Name Smell So
Sweetly of Success? Maybe Not, as Studio Executives Do Battle and Pay Big Bucks, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1997, available at 1999 WL 5375030.
63. Id.
64. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
65. See Entertainment Section, Walt Disney Company Homepage, at http://www.disney.go.
com (last visited, Dec. 1, 2001).
66. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Tom Roth, studio chief of Disney studios).
67. Id.
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Furthermore, not all conflicts are battles between the "big seven"
production companies. Predictably, when a large movie production
company squares off in negotiations with a small production company,
the larger company holds a considerable advantage. 68 For instance,
when Disney discovered that a small Sundance Film Festival film had
already registered the title Nothing to Lose, Disney negotiated for the
title.69 Eric Bross, the director of the original Nothing to Lose, said,
"Disney played a little game [and] dilly-dallied back and forth, hoping
we'd go away. They were trying to buy us off cheaply."7° Large pro-
duction companies like Disney can afford to play this game because they
have the financial backing, and indeed, Disney's resources eventually
proved overwhelming. Bross surrendered the rights to his title for a
mid-six-figure sum.7
When the conflicting parties cannot reach a settlement, one party
must either change its title or choose arbitration.72 Oliver Stone was
forced to change the title of his 1998 movie from "Stray Dogs," to "U-
Turn" because the original title was the property of Akira Kurosawa,
who would not clear the name.73 Additionally, MGM changed the name
of its 1997 urban drama from "Hurricane" to "Hurricane Streets"
because Paramount had owned the title "Hurricane" since 1979.71 Sub-
scribers must immediately report all settlements, either by negotiation,
change of title, or withdrawal of protest, to the Title Registration
Bureau, which publishes the relevant facts in its daily report.75 Only
then will the title be free of restriction and available for use by the pre-
76vailing party.
B. Arbitration
Arbitration is the only remedy in the rare event that the parties fail
to reach a settlement through direct negotiation. 7 The arbitration panel
conducts an informal hearing to decide if any "harmful similarity"
exists, and if so, to decide the respective usage rights of the parties.78
Although the Title Committee's arbitration process is largely informal, it




72. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8.
73. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 3.
74. See id.
75. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
76. See id.
77. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
78. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8, 9.
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nevertheless has instituted guidelines for the hearing.79 Specifically, all
arbitrators must be disinterested, must disclose any prior relationship
with the involved parties, and must sign a sworn and acknowledged
statement that he or she will "hear and decide the controversy faithfully
and fairly."8 Still, the Committee allows parties to challenge the impar-
tiality of arbitrators, which is determined by a vote of the remaining
arbitrators. 8' The Committee provides the losing party the right to
appeal before a disinterested panel of arbitrators, 82 and the winning party
the right to enforce its verdict in court.83
When asked about the function of the Bureau and its Title Commit-
tee, Mitchell Schwartz, the director of the Title Registration Bureau,
stated, "We operate to make sure there is no confusion in the general
public. ' 84 Thus, the main function of the arbitration panel is to ensure
that similar titles do not confuse the general public as to the identity or
origin of those films. To execute this task, the Title Committee has
given substantive guidelines to the arbitration panel regarding their "pri-
vate law."
The Title Committee defines "conflict" as "the harmful similarities
of titles which may cause public confusion as to the identity or origin of
a theatrical motion picture."85 Further, "[b]oth similarity and likelihood
of harm must be shown in order to prove 'conflict.'- 86 In evaluating the
respective rights to title use, the Title Committee states,
the arbitrators may consider all of the equities involved and allow the
balance of such equities to govern their decision. Factors that may be
weighed by panels include, but are not limited to, vintage and notori-
ety of each work; theme or plot of each work; investment in each
work; importance to the overall production/distribution plans; present
uses; prospects for theatrical release; theatrical sequels; theatrical
spin-offs and the like.
87
One recently arbitrated film was French Kiss, the 1995 Meg Ryan
comedy that was originally titled Paris Match.88 Castle Rock Entertain-
ment challenged 'the title, maintaining that it was too similar to Forget
79. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
80. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8.
81. See id. at 9 (noting that the director of the Title Bureau may cast the deciding vote in a
deadlock). In the event of removal of an arbitrator, the arbitration can be postponed until a full
quorum (three) of disinterested arbitrators can be assembled. Id. The parties additionally have the
right to waive their right to a quorum of disinterested arbitrators. Id.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 12.
88. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at Fl.
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Paris, the Billy Crystal comedy it planned to release within months of
the rival film.89 The arbitration panel decided that the public would be
confused, noting that both films were romantic comedies, partially set in
Paris, starring two actors who had previously starred in the romantic
comedy, When Harry Met Sally.9" Thus, because there was a harmful
similarity in titles and a possibility of public confusion as to identity or
origin of the motion picture, the Bureau forced Paris Match to change
its name to French Kiss.9' In contrast, a 1997 panel cleared New Line
Cinema's use of the title Austin Powers, The Spy Who Shagged Me
despite its similarity to the 1977 James Bond film The Spy Who Loved
Me.92
How did the panel reach these decisions? In determining whether
any harmful similarity exists, the Title Committee grants arbitration
panels great leeway. 93 In determining "conflict" and "rights," the Title
Committee lists factors that "may" be evaluated. However, it specifi-
cally states that the panel is not limited by this list and that "all the
equities involved" may be considered.94 The Title Committee lists
budget, status of scripts, investments already expended, proximity to
principal photography or theatrical release, theme or plot, marketing
campaign, and anticipated release pattern as factors for possible consid-
eration.95 In addition, when determining rights, the Title Committee
denies arbitrators the right to deprive the holder of an identical, previ-
ously registered title from using that title. 96 Nevertheless, the Title
Committee grants arbitrators the right to deprive the holder of a subse-
quently registered title of the right to use its title.97 In effect, registering
first guarantees you the right to use the title.
Despite these substantive guidelines and procedural rules, panel
decisions are not always predictable. Accordingly, a 2002 panel ruled
that the third Austin Powers movie could not use the title Austin Powers
in Goldmember because of its close relation to the James Bond classic
Goldfinger.98 Critics of this ruling claim that the government would not




92. See Austin Powers 3 Title Ruled 'Inadmissible' by MPAA, MOVIES.COM-NEWS (Jan. 28,
2002), at http://www.movies.go.com/news/2002/l/powerstitle012802.html.
93. Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
97. Id.
98. Austin Powers Loses Goldmember Appeal, BBC NEWS-FILM (Feb. 1, 2002), at http://
www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/entertainment/film/newsid_1795000/1795840.stm.
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no "harmful similarities which may lead to public confusion," and that
the MPAA has wielded too much power and infringed upon free
speech.99 Furthermore, it seems as though the panels are free to ignore
past precedent. Remember, a 1997 panel found no harmful similarities
between The Spy Who Shagged Me and The Spy Who Loved Me." °
Meanwhile, these critics' arguments may be moot, as the panel decision
seems to be based on New Line's failure to properly register its original
title with the Bureau; moreover, the studios seemed to disregard the rul-
ing by settling the conflict through negotiation.' Little information is
available to help resolve these conflicts. Aside from the final ruling,
confidentiality precludes the panels from publishing any findings or
opinions. 102
Creative producers can use the ambiguities and uncertainties of
Bureau rules to find loopholes for their title. For example, when Sony
produced Bram Stoker's Dracula and Marie Shelly's Frankenstein, the
original titles of Dracula and Frankenstein were registered to Universal
Studios. 3 By honoring the long-dead authors, Sony conveniently and
cleverly differentiated its films from the original horror movies. Univer-
sal took Sony to arbitration and the panel found no harmful similarities
in titles that might lead to public confusion as to origin or identity.
Thus, the panel ruled in Sony's favor.'0 4
99. Roger Ebert, 'Austin Powers' Title Creates No Confusion, TIMES UNION ALBANY, N.Y.,
Feb. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8892388; see also Forest Gabitsch, 'International Man of
Mystery' Surrenders His Freedom of Speech, U-WIRE, Feb. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL
12486331; Gayle MacDonald, Powers Play: The Studio that Litigated Me, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb.
9, 2002, available at West-news (quoting Marian Hebb, a copywrite lawyer in Toronto, "[the title
'Goldmember'is] clearly a parody. My guess would be if it got before a U.S. court, the judge
would label it a fair use of parody"). On the other hand, copywrite lawyer Claude Brunet, a
partner with the law firm Ogilvy Renault in Montreal, states, "From what I've seen in terms of the
trailers, the connection between Bond and Powers is obvious. The rules of parody are complex
... and one has to be extremely careful where one treads." Id.
100. See Austin Powers 3, at MOVIES.cOM-NEws supra note 92.
101. See id. (stating that New Line apparently failed to go through the proper channels); see
also Elaine Dutka, Morning Report Arts and Entertainment Reports front the Times, News Service
and the Nation's Press, L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 2002 at F2 (stating the arbitration panel found that
New Line had committed a technical infraction by going public with the title before it had been
properly registered, and additionally stating that the studios reached a private agreement which
will allow New Line to use the title "Goldmember" because New Line studio assured MGM they
will get future Bond parodies approved by MGM prior to release); M2-Showbiz-Eminem Kiss Rap,
2002 Birmingham Post & Mail Ltd., Apr. 12, 2002 at Evening Mail P49, available at 2002 WL
19003687 (stating that in return for MGM allowing New Line to use the title "Goldmember,"
NewLine has agreed to include advertisement trailers of upcoming MGM films in the opening
credits of "Goldmember" and "Lord of the Rings").
102. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10; see also supra text
accompanying note 62.
103. Goldstein, supra note I.
104. See id.
1080 [Vol. 56:1071
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Additionally, the Title Committee grants arbitration panels broad
powers in awarding damages. 10 5 For instance, take the panel's recent
decision against Miramax:106 The panel demanded a whopping $1,500
per-day, per-screen, for all 1,200 screens showing Miramax's Scream.1
0 7
The panel further demanded $20,000 for unauthorized use'0 8 and
$20,000 in legal fees.'0 9 Why did the panel exact such a significant
fine? When Miramax first registered the title, Sony registered a timely
complaint that the title was too similar to Sony's previously registered
Screamers.110 By the time the MPAA ordered an arbitration meeting,
Miramax had already been showing Scream in theaters for six weeks."'
Moreover, Miramax delayed an additional month before responding to
the complaint. 112 Thus, the panel levied the unprecedented fine to get
Miramax's attention for snubbing their nose at the process and causing
possible public confusion.' 13 In the aftermath of the fines, Miramax was
fortunate to quietly settle the dispute when Disney, Miramax's parent
company, gave Sony better terms on Starship Troopers, a sci-fi thriller
that the two studios co-produced. I" If the panel meant to deter future
105. Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 (stating that the panel may consider
all the relevant circumstances in determining damages, including but not limited to, the nature of
the violation, whether it was willful and whether the violation caused actual injury to the
prevailing party).
106. See Goldstein, supra note 1.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 (stating that a
Subscriber cannot use a protested title for which it does not have the rights under the terms of this
Memorandum and the Operating Rules). If a Subscriber uses a protested title or any other title for
which it does not have the right under the terms of this Memorandum and the Operating Rules, the
injured Subscriber(s) may request a general arbitration under the provisions of Article III Section
(d). Id. In the event of an unauthorized use, the arbitration or appeals' panel may consider the
following options as well as any others that the parties may offer. Id.
(1) A recommendation to the MPAA Board of Directors that the Subscriber's
registrations and membership be terminated under the provisions of Article V
Section (d) of the Memorandum of the Title Committee.
(2) A prohibition of any use of the title involved irrespective of whether or not there
exists a "conflict" as defined in Article III Section (a) of the Memorandum of the
Title Committee; or
(3) Any other corrective action that is fair under the circumstances after full
consideration of the facts and equities involved, including but not limited to
"corrective" advertising, changes of any further advertising or other materials in all
media including, but not limited to, changes of all prints bearing the offending title.
Id.
109. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 (stating that the arbitrator may
impose costs and reasonable attorneys' fees upon the losing party); see also Lee, supra note 7
(outlining the arbitration against Miramax).
110. Lee, supra note 7.
111. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at Fl.
112. See id.
113. See Goldstein, supra note 1.
114. See id. (noting that with Scream H, a sequel already in the works, Miramax would face a
20021 1081
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unfair use by levying such a healthy fine against Miramax, it seems to
have worked. As soon as the cease-and-desist order appeared from
MGM, the owners of the title Goldfinger-New Line Cinema-quickly
and quietly recalled already running trailers, posters, images, and online
promotional advertising containing Goldmember."5
The above instances are perfect examples of the Bureau creating
law through its arbitration panels and Title Committee. It declares judi-
cial and administrative rules of procedure, boasts an aggregate of judi-
cial precedents, and retains a body of authoritative grounds from which
it can base future decisions. Thus, the Bureau has created private law;
its private arbitration panels decree decisions that are enforceable by the
courts.' 1
6
Moreover, the Bureau has effectively cornered the market on title
conflict disputes among Subscribers by implementing its mandatory
"direct negotiation" or "arbitration" policy.17 In effect, this forces
plaintiff Subscribers to rely on arbitration panels to enforce their intel-
lectual property rights, while forcing defendant Subscribers to rely on
panels to enforce their creativity and right to freedom of speech. The
question this article seeks to resolve is whether the private panel's pro-
tection of Subscriber rights is in conflict with the protection that courts
would otherwise apply.
IV. PRIVATELY CREATED LAW VERSUS GOVERNMENT CREATED LAW.
Registering a title with the Bureau automatically assures protection
from unfair use. II The Bureau, however, only has jurisdiction over its
Subscribers, and if a non-Bureau member unfairly makes use of a Sub-
scriber's title, that Subscriber must turn to the courts for relief."19 Hence
the question: to what extent is the Subscriber entitled to protection?
Although consumers identify books, periodicals, newspapers, plays, tel-
evision programs, songs, record albums, and motion pictures by their
title, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 20 has
dramatic loss of box-office potential if it were promoted under a different title-thus, it chose to
settle instead of facing the possibility of an adverse ruling from the panel). Id.
115. See Austin Powers in Goldmember at http://www.upcomingmovies.com/austinpowers3.
html.
116. See supra text accompanying note 55.
117. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 1I, at 8.
118. See generally id.
119. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10; see also Title Committee
Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3-5.
120. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1148 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the United States Patent and
Trademark Office as the Department of Commerce agency that examines patent and trademark
applications, issues patents, registers trademarks, and furnishes patent and trademark information
and services to the public).
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stated that the titles of these single expressive works are "generic" and
therefore cannot be registered as trademarks. Likewise, courts have
resisted protecting the title of a single work.' 2' Historically, outside the
Bureau, the only realistic possibility for protecting the title of a single
motion picture was under the doctrine of unfair competition, an old com-
mon law concept now codified by statute. 2
A. The Government's Law
I. PRONG ONE: ENTITLEMENT TO PROTECTION
The doctrine of unfair competition burdens the plaintiff Subscriber
with proving: (1) that it is entitled to protection; and (2) that the defen-
dant's use of the title is likely to cause confusion among consumers.
23
The first prong is demanding, as it requires the plaintiff to show that the
title is "not generic;" and that the title has acquired a "secondary mean-
ing. '  The degree of protection a title will receive "is directly related
to the [title's] distinctiveness."'' 2 5 In determining distinctiveness, courts
typically categorize the movie title, in descending order of strength, 26 as
121. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:4 (4th ed. 1999); see
also In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 616-17 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (upholding the PTO's refusal to register
a book title but noting that the "rights in book titles are afforded appropriate protection under the
law of unfair competition"); Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999);
Maijack Prods., Inc. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 1996); Twin
-Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 n.4 (2d Cir. 1993); Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1998); Lee, supra note 7, at 21.
122. See Mary A. Donovan, On Your Mark! Basic Principles of Trademarks, 646 PLI/Pat 169,
174 (2001) (noting that most states have laws addressing this issue, and every state has its own
trademark registration system for marks used within its borders). The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1051, enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in 1946, codifies U.S.
Federal Law in this area. Id. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for
unfair competition, whether or not the mark is registered. Id.
123. Jenkins v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 706, 709 (E.D. Va. 2000).
124. Id. at 712 (finding the title First Contact to be generic and not entitled to trademark
protection). Additionally, Jenkins notes that titles of expressive works are treated differently than
other trademarks. Id. Titles, even if suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful [not generic], nonetheless
require secondary meaning to receive trademark protection, while other suggestive, arbitrary, or
fanciful marks do not. Id. See also McCarthy, supra note 121, § 10:2 (stating that the courts have
given trademark protection to literary titles of one-shot, single works only upon a showing of
secondary meaning, even though the title is not descriptive).
125. Id.
126. See id.
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either "fanciful," "arbitrary,""27 "suggestive,"' 28  "descriptive," 129 or
"generic." 3
If a court finds a Subscriber's title to be "generic," the title is not
entitled to trademark protection.' 3 ' Accordingly, when the author of the
1945 short story First Contact sued Paramount for its 1996 movie Star
Trek, First Contact, the court did not protect the author because it
deemed the title generic. 3 2 The court determined that the phrase First
Contact had come to describe an entire genre of science fiction, namely
literature regarding humankind's first encounter with extraterrestrial
life. 33
In contrast, when the producers of Tom Cruise's Top Gun sued an
amusement park that intended to name a ride after the movie, the courts
categorized "Top Gun" as descriptive. 134 The category into which the
court places a title, whether generic or descriptive, is vital to the life of
127. Id. The court defined fanciful or arbitrary marks as "coined words that bear no
relationship to the products with which they are associated." Id. (noting Clorox Chem. Co. v.
Chlorit Mfg. Corp., 25 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Clorox"); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow,
739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Kodak"); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Huntingworld, Inc.,
537 F.2d 4, 9 n.6 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Ivory" soap)). Additionally, the court stated that "[t]hese marks
are terms that enter the language as a trademark for a particular good or service." Id.
128. Id. The court defined suggestive marks as "words which suggest some quality or
character of a product, but not clearly enough to avoid the need for imagination." Id. (citing
Coca-Cola Co. v. 7-Up Co., 497 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("uncola" soft drink); Stick Prods.,
Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("contact" for self-adhesive
shelf paper)).
129. Id. The court defined descriptive marks as "marks which identify a characteristic, quality,
or other aspect of a product or service with which it is associated. They are not protectible unless
consumers have learned to associate them with a single source, i.e., they have acquired 'secondary
meaning'...." Id. (citing Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 266 A.2d 87 (1970)
("Holiday Inn" Motel); Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc. v. Bus. Computer Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q.
634 (T.T.A.B. 1983) ("Intelligent Modem"); King-Size, Inc. v. Franks King Size Clothes, Inc.,
547 F. Supp 1138 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("King Size" clothing for larger men)).
130. Id. The court defined generic, unprotectible terms as "common descriptions for classes of
goods to which a particular product belongs." Id. (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111 (1938) ("Shredded Wheat" held generic and unprotectible); Locite Corp. v. Nat'l Starch
& Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Super Glue" held unprotectible)).
131. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (stating a generic term is not entitled to trademark
protection because "no matter ... what success [the trademark owner) has achieved in securing
public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the right to call an article by
its name").
132. See Jenkins v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 706, 712 (E.D. Va. 2000).
133. See id. (finding that the title of a single expressive work is generic if that title is the name
of a subcategory of which the work in question is a member). Id. Therefore, a film such as The
Godfather is not merely a species of motion pictures, it is a species of the "mobster movie" genre.
Id.
134. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 698 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (finding the title Top Gun to be at least descriptive because no evidence supported the
proposition that that segment of society already familiar with the U.S. Navy Miramar training
facility immediately understood that the movie was meant to portray the school).
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the lawsuit. The court granted relief to Top Gun's producer whereas the
court granted nothing to the author of First Contact.
135
Still, under government-created law, even if a movie producer
proves the title is not generic, he or she will not be entitled to protection
unless "secondary meaning" is also established. 136 A title only achieves
secondary meaning if the public perceives the title to be a designation of
the origin of the product. 137 Courts use the following factors to deter-
mine secondary meaning: advertising expenditures, consumer studies,
sales success, unsolicited media coverage of the work, attempts to
plagiarize the mark, the length and exclusivity of the mark's use, and
evidence of actual confusion.' 38 Hence, Paramount, the producers of
Top Gun, established secondary meaning because the public associates
the words "Top Gun" with Paramount's motion picture, thereby sug-
gesting to the public that products bearing that name emanate from a
single source. 139  Using a similar analysis, a court found secondary
meaning in the titles JAWS and JAWS 2.140 In these cases, the court
noted the large amount of monetary expenditures and extensive promo-
tional efforts as exceptionally relevant in its determination of secondary
meaning. 141
Additionally, an unreleased film can acquire a secondary mean-
ing. '42 Thus, evidence of extensive prerelease advertising led a Califor-
nia court to find secondary meaning in the film title The Wonderful Life
of the Brother's Grimm, even though the film was not complete. 1  A
New York court reaffirmed this concept when it granted Orion Pictures
Company the opportunity to establish secondary meaning in its title, A
Little Romance, even though the motion picture was not yet complete.' 44
135. See id.; see also Jenkins, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
136. See supra text accompanying note 124.
137. Id.
138. Jenkins, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (holding that the literary work First Contact had no
secondary meaning because the plaintiffs never spent any substantial time, energy, or money
advertising or promoting the mark; consumers did not believe that First Contact primarily refers to
the story; the story only achieved slight sales success; there was rare unsolicited media coverage;
the mark was not plagiarized; and consumer confusion was limited).
139. See Paramount, 698 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
140. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 852, 856
(N.D. 111. 1980) (finding secondary meaning because of the wide dissemination of the JAWS
books, the large number of people who have been exposed to the movie, the wide dissemination of
merchandising properties licensed under the mark "JAWS," and the court's own observation and
experience).
141. See id.
142. See McCarthy, supra note 121, at § 10:4, 277 (1973) (stating that if a work is not
released, a significant amount of prerelease publicity of the title may cause the title to acquire
recognition sufficient for protection).
143. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1963).
144. See Orion Pictures Co. v. Dell Publ'g Co., 471 F. Supp 392, 396 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (finding
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Thus, a movie producer is entitled to judicial protection for released and
unreleased movie titles. Although, to gain this protection, the movie
producer must first establish "distinctiveness" and "secondary
meaning."
1 45
II. PRONG TWO: LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
A plaintiff who establishes "distinctiveness" and "secondary mean-
ing" passes the first hurdle in the burden of proof; 4 6 but there is an
additional barrier: proving likelihood of confusion. 47 To meet this bur-
den, it is not necessary to demonstrate that consumers would identify the
plaintiff's movie producer as the source of defendant's product, but
merely that consumers are likely to assume that the defendant's product
is "sponsored, affiliated, or associated with the source of plaintiff's
movie."' 48 Additionally, it is important to remember that it is the likeli-
hood of confusion that serves as a test for infringement, not actual con-
fusion. This is especially true where the alleged infringing title has not
been advertised or released.' 49 Traditionally, likelihood of confusion is
determined by evaluating a number of factors, commonly referred to as
the "digits of confusion."' 5° Among the digits of confusion are: (1)
strength of the infringed mark;' 5 1 (2) similarity of the marks; 5 2 (3)
degree to which the products or services compete; 153 (4) existence of an
intent to trade upon the goodwill of the plaintiff's mark;1 54 (5) evidence
extensive pre-release advertising and the defendant's plan to count on the plaintiffs publicity as
the primary means by which to promote its product as evidence of pre-release secondary
meaning).
145. See id.; see also Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v Leisure Time Prods., 14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
146. See Jenkins, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (offering the plaintiff no relief because no evidence
was offered to pass the first prong of the government burden, "entitlement to relief").
147. See generally McCarthy, supra note 121, at § 15:10 (1973).
148. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 698 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
149. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Minn.
1998) (finding likelihood of confusion when American Dairy Queen Corporation sued the makers
of the then unreleased movie titled Dairy Queens).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 730. Two factors measure a mark's strength: the distinctiveness of the mark and the
extent to which the mark is recognized by the relevant consumer class. Id.
152. Id. Similarity of marks is tested on three levels: sight, sound, and meaning. Id. Each
must be considered as they are encountered in the marketplace. Id.
153. Id. Where products are in direct competition, the degree of similarity required to prove
likelihood of confusion will be less than in the case of noncompetitive products, and lack of direct
competition does not preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion. Id.
154. Id. at 731. An inference of intent to trade upon plaintiffs goodwill arises if the defendant,
with knowledge of plaintiff's mark, chooses a mark similar to the plaintiff's mark regardless of
the infinite number of possible marks. Id.
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of actual confusion;155 (6) likelihood of expansion of the product lines
into the same markets; 5 6 (7) sophistication of buyers; 15 7 and (8) quality
of defendant's products. 158 When reaching a conclusion, courts are free
to weigh some factors more heavily than others, holding no one factor as
dispositive. "I9
Using a similar analysis, one court found a likelihood of confusion
between the original motion picture, Bridge on the River Kwai, and the
subsequent motion picture, Return from the River Kwai.16° Applying the
"digits of confusion," the court found the original title was strong, the
titles were substantially the same, the products were in close proximity,
there was evidence of actual consumer confusion, the subsequent film
had not received positive reviews, and the producers of the subsequent
film had acted in bad faith in adopting their title.' 6' Likewise, in Para-
mount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., the court found a
strong likelihood of consumer confusion in an amusement park ride
named "Top Gun".'62 The riders that engaged in mock space battles
most likely believed that the ride was sponsored, affiliated, or had some
connection to the origin of a movie with the same name.
163
Because this law gives courts great leeway in determining likeli-
hood of confusion, not all courts agree on a definition. For instance,
when the creator of the movie JAWS sued Montgomery Ward for using
"Jaws" to identify Ward's trash compacters, a court found a likelihood
of confusion as to source, approval, or sponsorship. 164 The court stated
that Ward's adoption of the term "Jaws", with intent to capitalize on the
plaintiff's mark, leads to a strong inference of likelihood of confusion.
165
In contrast, when the creators of the movie Godzilla sued Sears for using
"Bagzilla" to identify its "monstrously strong garbage bags," that court




158. Id. at 730-33; see also Lee, supra note 7, at 18.
159. See Lee, supra note 7, at 18.
160. See Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., 14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 355-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
161. See id. at 357 (permanently enjoining and restraining the defendants from releasing the
movie under the title Return from the River Kwai or with any other title containing the words
"River Kwai" or under any title that is confusingly similar to "Bridge on the River Kwai" or
"Kwai ").
162. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 698 F. Supp. 1274, 1274 (E.D.
Pa. 1988).
163. Id.
164. See Universal City Studios, 207 U.S.P.Q. at 857.
165. Id.
166. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981).
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JAWS court erred when it assumed that an intent to 'capitalize' was
enough. In order to raise an inference of likelihood of confusion, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to profit by confusing
consumers."'167 Thus, although courts unanimously require a plaintiff to
show both entitlement to protection and likelihood of confusion, they
often disagree as to the definition of these requirements.
B. The Comparison
Is there a conflict in the protection afforded by these two different
forums? Like the courts, Bureau arbitration panels possess great latitude
in determining "conflict," which leads to an analysis of law comparable
to the courts' varying analyses of likelihood of confusion. The Commit-
tee defines "conflict" as "the harmful similarity of titles which may
cause public confusion as to the identity or origin of a theatrical motion
picture."'' 68 The courts, in attempting to determine likelihood of confu-
sion, are similarly looking for harmful similarities that may cause public
confusion as to identity or origin.1 69 The Title Committee additionally
provides a list of factors which may be used in determining conflict;1
7 0
however, similar to the governments "digits of confusion," no one Com-
mittee factor is determinative, and the arbitrators are not limited by the
list. 17 1 Similarly, both forums allow the respective fact-finders broad
power to balance the equities as they choose.
Additionally, both sets of law, albeit different in substance and pro-
cedure, are admittedly operating for the same purpose. The Bureau
"operates to make sure there is no confusion in the general public,"'' 17
and "the purpose of providing trademark protection... is to protect the
public from confusion with respect to the origin of products or ser-
vices."' 173 Although these two sets of laws have different sources, per-
haps they are not absolutely irreconcilable.
To determine whether they conflict, it is valuable to examine the
variances in existing remedies under these laws. Both the private law of
the MPAA and the judicial law of the courts have respective advantages
and disadvantages with respect to available remedies. As stated, the
Bureau arbitration panels have broad power in awarding damages.' 74
167. Id.
168. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
169. See Universal City Studios, 207 U.S.P.Q. at 857.
170. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12.
171. Id.
172. Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
173. Parmount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 698 F. Supp. 1274, 1277 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
174. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 ("[A]rbitrators are free to
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Similarly, courts have great leeway in determining both actual 7 5 and
statutory damages.' 76 Courts, however, have the additional power to
freeze the assets of the infringer,177 whereas the MPAA's private arbitra-
tion panels have no stated power to freeze assets.
78
Likewise, a conflict may exist in recovery of attorneys' fees.
Under the Bureau, arbitrators may impose costs and reasonable attor-
neys' fees on the losing party. 179 Courts can also award attorneys' fees
under government created laws, but only in "exceptional cases."' 80 A
closer examination of the operating rules of the Committee suggests that
these forums are not completely dissimilar in awarding attorneys' fees.
The Title Committee states that, "the arbitrators are free to consider all
the relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, whether the
position taken by the losing party was frivolous."'' This could lead to
results similar to the courts' "exceptional cases" standard.
182
Lastly, an examination of these laws would be incomplete without
a discussion of the contrasting policies regarding the defendant's use of
infringing titles. Under the MPAA's private law, an absolute bar from
using the potentially conflicting title exists from the instant a complaint
is registered until the respective rights of the parties are determined.' 83
As evidence of the seriousness of this rule, the Bureau's arbitration
panel fined Miramax heavily for its unauthorized use of the title
Scream.'84 In contrast, if a Subscriber sues in court, the defendant can
still exploit the infringing title during the course of litigation. The court
consider all of the relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, the nature of the violation,
whether it was willful and whether the violation caused actual injury to the prevailing party.").
175. See Mark S. Lee, supra note 36, at 19 (stating that courts may award actual damages, the
defendant's wrongful profit, and if the infringement of the mark is intentional, an order trebling
the actual damages).
176. See id. (stating that the court will determine the amount of statutory damages from a low
of $500 for an innocent infringement to a high of $1 million for a willful infringement).
177. See Brandon v. Univ. of Cal. 441 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Mass. 1977) (awarding an
accounting of all of the defendant's gross income from the sale and rental of the infringing film);
see also Reebok Int'l v. Marnatech Enter. 970 F.2d 552, 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
178. See generally Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12-13. (stating possible
remedies such as costs, attorneys' fees, and damages, but no mention of freezing assets).
179. Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13; see also Goldstein, supra note I
(noting that the arbitration panel forced Miramax to pay attorneys' fees and costs for the
unauthorized use of the title Scream).
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (a)-(b) (2000); see also Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time
Prods., 14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding attorneys' fees in willful infringement
cases interpreted as "exceptional cases").
181. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13.
182. See Brandon, 441 F. Supp. at 1090 (D. Mass. 1977) (awarding reasonable attorneys' fees
in an "exceptional case" because of the deliberate actions and frivolous claims of the defendant).
183. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13; see also supra text
accompanying note 97.
184. See Linda Lee, supra note 62.
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does not strip the defendant of that right until the conclusion of the
case. 85 While a court could take years to decide a case, a plaintiff's
movie title could suffer "irreparable harm"' 8 6 as it becomes diluted of its
goodwill. 8 7 This does not occur under the MPAA's procedure. Once a
conflict is reported to the Bureau, the defendant is immediately enjoined
from using the conflicting title.' 88
Can this difference be reconciled? Under government law, if a pro-
ducer truly seeks to protect the goodwill in his title, he can seek a pre-
liminary injunction.' 89 If granted, a preliminary injunction mandates
that the defendant stop its use of the possibly infringing title until the
court determines the rights of the respective parties.' 90 A court's power
to grant a preliminary injunction is most analogous to the Title Commit-
tee's absolute ban on unauthorized use. An absolute ban ensures the
plaintiff's protection from unfair use throughout the trial. Before
obtaining a preliminary injunction, however, the plaintiff movie pro-
ducer must show "probability of success." 19 1
In the judicial system, the moving plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing the existence of a probability of its ultimate success on the merits, or
a court must deny the preliminary injunction. 9 In application, a movie
producer plaintiff would at the very least be required to make a clear,
strong showing of "distinctiveness," "secondary meaning," and "likeli-
hood of confusion."' 193 Many courts additionally require the plaintiff to
establish irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction and
to establish that the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. 94 A
185. See Tri-Star, 14 F. Supp. 2d 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
186. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 698 F. Supp. 1273, 1283 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (stating that courts have consistently concluded that irreparable harm follows from the
unauthorized use of a mark, because the plaintiff has an inability to exercise control over the
products to which the unauthorized user will attach plaintiffs mark).
187. See Tristar, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (defining dilution as the blurring of the title's
identification power or the tamishment of the affirmative associations the title conveys); see also
Donovan, supra note 122, at 175 (defining dilution as the likelihood to lesson the strength of a
famous mark).
188. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13.
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000); see also McCarthy, supra note 121, §30:45 at 30-85; see
also Lee, supra note 36, at 19; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming a preliminary injunction granted for the infringement of an
unregistered mark).
190. See generally McCarthy, supra note 121, § 30:45.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.; see also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., 698 F. Supp.
1274, 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
194. See Paramount, 698 F. Supp. at 1286 (granting a preliminary injunction because the title
Top Gun was descriptive and had a strong secondary meaning, a strong likelihood of confusion
and plaintiff showed irreparable harm); see also Eagle Snacks, Inc. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 625 F.
Supp. 571 (D.N.J. 1985).
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court may also require the court to balance these two requirements
against the harm to the defendant if the plaintiff's motion is granted.
195
Thus, when American Dairy Queen Corporation brought a trademark
suit seeking a preliminary injunction against the producer of a 1999
movie for the title Dairy Queens,'9 6 the court applied the four-part test:
irreparable harm, balancing the interest, the probability of success on the
merits, and the public interest. 197 The court granted Dairy Queen's pre-
liminary injunction because: (1) irreparable harm was likely to result
from the off-color humor and content contained in a movie with a simi-
lar name; (2) the harm caused by forcing the defendant to change his
title was highly conjectural; (3) the plaintiff was likely to succeed on all
claims; and (4) it was in the public interest to avoid consumer
confusion.' 98
The courts do provide a means for movie producers to protect their
title from unfair use without a full trial on the merits; however, even the
most lenient of jurisdictions still require the movie producer to establish
a "better than negligible chance of succeeding at trial."' 99 Thus, courts
have once again imposed a burden of proof on the movie producer plain-
tiff which the private law of the MPAA does not require. Perhaps these
court imposed evidentiary burdens prompted studio giants within the
MPAA to create their own law through private arbitration. Should any
group, like the MPAA, be able to create its own private forum, thereby
removing itself from the jurisdiction of the courts? To examine this
question, it is helpful to evaluate the results of the MPAA's privatization
of law.
V. CONCLUSION
What has the MPAA done? It has created an arbitration procedure
"by which disputes concerning titles recorded with its Title Arbitration
Bureau may be quickly resolved. 2 °° Subscribers to the Bureau contrac-
tually agree to comply with such determinations, and the determinations
are enforceable by the courts.20' In effect, the MPAA has created its
195. Id.
196. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D. Minn.
1998) (stating that Dairy Queens was a New Line production "mockumentary," satirizing beauty
contests in dairy producing rural Minnesota).
197. Id. at 729.
198. See generally id.
199. See McCarthy, supra note 121, § 30:45, at 30-87 (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess
Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986)).
200. See Lee, supra note 36, at 21.
201. See Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
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own private law, but has this privatization of law served any beneficial
purpose?
The Bureau director states that the function of the bureau is to
resolve disputes quickly and efficiently between Subscribers, avoiding
any confusion of the viewing public.2 2 The Bureau has achieved quick-
ness and efficiency. It inarguably settles disputes quicker than courts. If
the MPAA's title registration process was not in place, the procedure for
selecting a movie title would be even longer and more expensive than
the current procedure.2"3 Presently, if one wishes to avoid a potentially
expensive lawsuit, it is crucial to ensure that a same or similar title is not
in use before finalizing a title choice.20 4 Outside of the Bureau, this is a
painstaking process. One must contract with a professional search com-
pany, which can cost anywhere from $400 and upward. 205 Although it is
possible to search the USPTO over the Internet at www.uspto.com, the
search will not provide access to unregistered common law trademark
uses such as movie titles.206 Thus, one must still contract a professional
search agency in order to receive a search report.20 7 Subscribers to the
Bureau, on the other hand, simply read the daily Title Registration
Report that the Bureau distributes to inform Subscribers of the conflict-
ing movie titles registered with the Bureau.20 8
To make the process more efficient, the Bureau explicitly states in
its operating rules that its policy is either to negotiate directly or to arbi-
trate.20 9 Because Subscribers to the Bureau settle over ninety-nine per-
cent of their title conflicts through direct negotiation, the parties save
invaluable time and money by avoiding arbitration.2 0  Furthermore,
even if the dispute reaches arbitration, the process is still swifter than
litigating a case in court because the Bureau explicitly states that the
arbitration hearing "shall be conducted informally and ... no trial-type
or extraordinary procedures shall be imposed .. ,.1. Moreover, it is
likely that the MPAA panel, consisting of experts in the motion picture
production field, may be more efficient than the courts at resolving these
disputes because each case in the judicial forum requires educating the
court as to the intricacies of the motion picture production field.
The MPAA has inarguably created a faster and more efficient pro-
202. Id.
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cess while effectively limiting public confusion. As previously dis-
cussed, the courts as well as the MPAA arbitration panels have the
power to enjoin an offending party from using conflicting titles. The
MPAA, however, has gone one step further. The Bureau's process
almost assures that the public will never see conflicting titles in the mar-
ketplace 21 2 because the instant a Subscriber registers a complaint with
the Bureau, there is an absolute bar from using the potentially conflict-
ing title until an arbitration panel determines the respective rights of the
parties.21 3 This is proof of the Bureau's accomplishment of its foremost
objective: preventing consumer confusion regarding the identity and ori-
gin of motion pictures.214 Moreover, the Bureau seems to have accom-
plished its goal more efficiently and effectively than the courts.
Still, how balanced is the enforcement of rights under these two
different forums? Critics of the MPAA claim that panel decisions
infringe on Subscriber creativity and right to freedom of speech because
studio executives/arbitrators place a high value on the protection of Sub-
scriber intellectual property rights in already registered titles.215 Perhaps
this is a valid argument, as there appear to be conflicting policies
between the two forums. Courts limit the protection a title receives in
order to promote creativity and free speech, whereas the Bureau places a
higher value on protecting Subscribers' intellectual property rights.
Although the distinction appears to be theoretically reasonable, it fails in
its application.
History demonstrates that the Bureau's private law has been
enforced in a manner similar to judicial law.2 6 Arbitration panels have
promoted creativity and freedom of speech by allowing Sony to use both
Bram Stoker's Dracula and Marie Shelly's Frankenstein, even though
Universal Studios had registered the original titles of Dracula and
Frankenstein.2" 7 Likewise, the panels allowed New Line's Austin Pow-
ers-The Spy Who Shagged Me to parody MGM's The Spy Who Loved
Me.218 Similarly, courts have promoted intellectual property rights by
finding a likelihood of confusion between the original motion picture,
212. See Lee, supra note 62 (discussing the harsh results that Miramax suffered due to public
confusion created by the use of a conflicting title before the arbitration panel determined the
parties' respective rights).
213. See Title Committee Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13; supra text accompanying note
97.
214. See Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
215. See supra note 88.
216. See Telephone Interview with Mitchell Schwartz, supra note 10.
217. Goldstein, supra note 1.
218. See Austin Powers 3 at MOviES.CoM-NEwS, supra note 92 (stating the panel's recent
decision objecting to New Line's use of Goldmember may have been based on New Line's
procedural infractions in title registration).
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Bridge on the River Kwai, and the subsequent motion picture, Return
from the River Kwai,2" 9 and by finding secondary meaning in the film
title The Wonderful Life of the Brother's Grimm, even though the film
itself was incomplete at the time.220 Moreover, different forums within
the judicial system itself weigh some equities more heavily than others.
Still, there is no bright-line policy separating the two forums' respective
line of decisions.
In sum, the MPAA has privatized public law, and has effectively
done so for over seventy-five years. Its process allows motion picture
studios to contract out of the judicial system by signing arbitration
agreements, while creating an efficient arbitration process that applies a
set of rules consistent with trademark law. The MPAA arbitration pro-
cess is the paradigmic example of privatization of law. It defies the old
maxim, "don't take the law into your own hands." For over seventy-five
years the MPAA has taken the law into its own hands, and has come out
a winner.
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